

**INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS:
COORDINATION THROUGH EDUCATION
BY
Robert E. Smith
LCDR United States Navy**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Second Term AY 00-01

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

20010927 075

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No.
0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 30-05-2001		2. REPORT TYPE monograph		3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-02-2001 to xx-05-2001	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS: COORDINATION THROUGH EDUCATION Unclassified				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Smith, Robert E. ; Author				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command & General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS66027				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This monograph examines the possibilities of improving interagency coordination through an established educational system. The national security interests of the United States rely on the efficient and effective application all instruments of power. The Department of State and Department of Defense are typically responsible for the direction, implementation, and enforcement of foreign policy. However, threats to national security in the twenty-first century may require a more multifunctional interagency approach with diverse capabilities. A single organization does not have these required capabilities. Through a collaborative effort of various government agencies and departments, these capabilities are available. The interagency process is the national level system to coordinate the actions of government agencies in national security affairs. Interagency operations require the cooperation of participating organizations. This monograph researched the development of joint military operations to illustrate necessary actions required to achieve this synergistic effort. From the Unified Command Plan of 1947 to a unified action? concept of 2001, the military has gained insight into the difficulties of service coordination and cooperation. Significant to this study was the lesson learned concerning education and the development of a joint force. An outcome of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the requirement for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oversee the educational development of joint specialty officers (JSO) in order to fill joint duty assignments. The joint professional military education (JPME) curriculum balanced service specific and joint educational requirements. JPME provides a common reference for joint duty officers to collectively plan military operations. This monograph concludes that a professional education system can improve interagency coordination through a shared learning experience. Recognizing the bureaucratic difficulties associated with coordinating and directing government agencies, an expanded educational system can benefit the interagency effort by producing individuals knowledgeable in their profession. Similar to the JSO, individuals who comprehend the interagency system and understand its participants can provide the necessary link to facilitate planning and execution. This study proposes the design of an interagency curriculum to achieve professional development similar to the JPME process. Additionally the monograph recommends instruction of the interagency curriculum at the National Defense University (NDU), senior and intermediate level service colleges and a combined interagency institution. The monograph advocates the addition of government agency personnel to the student body and faculty mix of NDU and service schools.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS joint professional military education (JPME); joint military operations; interagency cooperation;					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	
a. REPORT Unclassified		Same as Report (SAR)	51	Burgess, Ed burgesse@leavenworth.army.mil	
b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number 913758-3171 DSN 585-3171			
				Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18	

Abstract

INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS: COORDINATION THROUGH EDUCATION by
LCDR Robert E. Smith, USN, 46 PAGES.

This monograph examines the possibilities of improving interagency coordination through an established educational system. The national security interests of the United States rely on the efficient and effective application all instruments of power. The Department of State and Department of Defense are typically responsible for the direction, implementation, and enforcement of foreign policy. However, threats to national security in the twenty-first century may require a more multifunctional interagency approach with diverse capabilities. A single organization does not have these required capabilities. Through a collaborative effort of various government agencies and departments, these capabilities are available. The interagency process is the national level system to coordinate the actions of government agencies in national security affairs. Interagency operations require the cooperation of participating organizations. This monograph researched the development of joint military operations to illustrate necessary actions required to achieve this synergistic effort. From the Unified Command Plan of 1947 to a "unified action" concept of 2001, the military has gained insight into the difficulties of service coordination and cooperation. Significant to this study was the lesson learned concerning education and the development of a joint force. An outcome of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the requirement for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oversee the educational development of joint specialty officers (JSO) in order to fill joint duty assignments. The joint professional military education (JPME) curriculum balanced service specific and joint educational requirements. JPME provides a common reference for joint duty officers to collectively plan military operations.

This monograph concludes that a professional education system can improve interagency coordination through a shared learning experience. Recognizing the bureaucratic difficulties associated with coordinating and directing government agencies, an expanded educational system can benefit the interagency effort by producing individuals knowledgeable in their profession. Similar to the JSO, individuals who comprehend the interagency system and understand its participants can provide the necessary link to facilitate planning and execution. This study proposes the design of an interagency curriculum to achieve professional development similar to the JPME process. Additionally the monograph recommends instruction of the interagency curriculum at the National Defense University (NDU), senior and intermediate level service colleges and a combined interagency institution. The monograph advocates the addition of government agency personnel to the student body and faculty mix of NDU and service schools.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to extend a special thanks to the persons who richly contributed to this monograph. First and foremost, my devoted wife, Cindy, for her understanding of late evening edits and providing a critical civilian perspective. I also wish to recognize and thank my monograph director, Geoff Babb, for his insight and direction while making discoveries.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Government or the Department of Defense.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Disclaimer	iv
Table of Contents.....	v
Introduction	1
Research Problem.....	1
Monograph Purpose and Hypothesis	2
Methodology.....	3
The Interagency Challenge.....	5
The Interagency Process	5
Interagency at the Operational and Tactical Levels.....	9
The Interagency Effort.....	12
Chapter Summary.....	13
The UCP, JSO and JPME	14
Legislation and the Unified Effort.....	14
Goldwater-Nichols Act and Education.....	19
Joint Professional Military Education.....	20
Chapter Summary.....	23
Education and the Interagency Effort.....	25
The Future of Interagency Operations	26
Training and Education.....	28
A Proposed Interagency Educational Model.....	29
Supporting Concepts.....	33
The Bureaucratic Problem.....	35
Chapter Summary.....	36
CONCLUSIONS.....	38
Summary.....	38
Conclusions.....	40
Recommendations	40
BIBLIOGRAPHY	42

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.

Clausewitz

The United States national security strategy for the 21st Century requires a synergistic effort to effectively employ all the elements of national power. Additionally, the complex strategic environment, compounded by a reduction of available resources, requires government agencies and departments to collaborate and work together towards common objectives. Joint doctrine defines this collaboration as unified action, “the wide scope of actions to integrate joint, single-service, special, and supporting operations with interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational operations.”¹ Joint doctrine also asserts, “the essence of interagency coordination is the interplay of multiple agencies with individual agendas.”² The individual agendas, bolstered by civil and military cultures, create an atmosphere that detracts from the unity of effort.

Research Problem

It is imperative to the success of interagency operations that the United States strive to reduce friction and overcome the cultural gap between participating agencies. The Department of Defense, due to its warrior ethos and organizational structure, experiences one of the most severe cultural gaps when working with other government agencies. The

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Chairman, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Final Coordination (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 5, 2001).

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Chairman, Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 9, 1996), 1-5.

policies and directives that exist pertaining to interagency coordination prescribe methods to mitigate the effects of cultural differences, rather than bridge this gap. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), issued in 1997 by President William Jefferson Clinton, provides fundamental guidance for coordinating interagency efforts in complex contingency operations. PDD 56 outlines the tools and mechanisms critical to interagency success, however, it does not address the education of personnel associated with the interagency process. PDD 56 does direct the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate with government educational institutions (i.e. National Defense University) to develop a mid-level manager interagency training program.³ A training program may familiarize personnel with procedures and organization, but does not create the learning atmosphere afforded by an educational environment or a more operationally oriented exercise program. Furthermore, the PDD is a tool that may not survive the change of administrations and thus only temporarily affects the interagency process.

National security policy-makers confront the problem of preparing personnel who are knowledgeable and culturally aware of the interagency process. It is important to educate people in the interagency process as well as train them on the interagency mechanisms. This monograph explores the problem of how to educate agency personnel, and more specifically, Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, in the interagency process.

Monograph Purpose and Hypothesis

The purpose of this paper is to research the impact of mandated interagency education for governmental educational institutions. Specifically, this paper will examine the

³ National Security Council, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1997). Internet accessed [<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc2html>], January 19, 2001.

professional military education (PME) process. The objective of this monograph is to provide an alternative approach to facilitating interagency coordination. This monograph tests the following hypothesis: An established professional education system improves interagency coordination and cooperation.

Methodology

Doctrinally, the interagency process involves the United States government, non-governmental agencies, and international organizations. For the purpose of this paper, interagency concerns only United States governmental agencies (i.e., DoD, State, Justice . . .). International organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO) play an instrumental role in interagency operations, but the training and education of their personnel is beyond the control of the United States government. However, outreach invitations and government-funded programs can be made available.

An understanding of the interagency process is essential to the development of this research project. The historical development of interagency operations from the 1947 National Security Act to ongoing contributions in the Balkans illustrates the complexity and need for properly educated and informed personnel. This monograph details the interagency process at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. An understanding of how interagency operations apply at the different levels of conflict is important in establishing who should be trained and what the curriculum should look like to improve the interagency process.

Historical analysis of joint operations and the impact of joint professional military education (JPME) are the cornerstone for this monograph. Congruent with the interagency objective of maximizing resources, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1947

unified the armed services to maximize defense assets. A product of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act was the educated and trained Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). The professional education of the JSO is designed "to develop joint attitudes and perspectives, expose officers to and increase their understanding of service cultures while concentrating on joint operations."⁴ Although interagency and joint operations are not identical, a common valuable resource is the personnel who are educated and trained to plan and execute coordinated operations that maximize all available assets. The JSO, independent of any one service, is educated for the common good of the military. Applied to the interagency process, the JSO model or expanded JSO responsibilities offer possibilities of educating personnel for the common good of national security.

The successes and failures of mandated PME in joint operations serve as the evaluation criteria for this monograph. Successful joint operations since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act offer evidence to support the implementation of professional education to achieve a unity of effort. Interagency operations can benefit from this joint military lesson in the implementation of a successful educational system.

⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 1800.01A, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, December 1, 2000), A-B-6.

CHAPTER TWO

The Interagency Challenge

Although the “interagency process is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity,” the interagency effort is not an original concept for national security.⁵ The practice of convening advisors in a centralized forum traces back to Alexander the Great. In his military conquests Alexander relied upon the “King’s Companions.” This was an organized advisory group that offered assistance in making decisions concerning military, diplomatic and economic affairs.⁶ More recently, the commitment of armed forces to the United States interventions in El Salvador, Grenada, Panama, Haiti, and the Balkans incorporated multiple governmental agencies whose support was critical to achieving national and military objectives.⁷ To comprehend the benefit of reducing the cultural gaps inherent to interagency operations it is important to understand the complexities of the interagency process. This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the interagency process and identifies associated problems.

The Interagency Process

As Alexander enjoyed success from the coordinated efforts of military and non-military resources, twenty-first century national and military leaders call upon one another to synchronize efforts and provide mutually beneficial support. The interagency process, however, is more than supported and supporting departments or organizations.

⁵ Gabriel Marcella, “National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21st Century,” ed. Douglas T. Stuart, Organizing For National Security, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2000), 164.

⁶ A.R. Burn, Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic World, New England Edition, (Collier Books; New York, 1962; reprint, Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), 70-71.

⁷ Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott More, “Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can’t Ignore,” Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, (Winter 1998): 99. Internet Accessed [<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98winter/moore.htm>] on January 19, 2001.

Joint doctrine defines interagency coordination as “the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the United States Government as well as nongovernmental agencies.”⁸

The operating environment of the twenty-first century requires establishing links between the military and governmental agencies. In 1941, Professor E. Pendleton Herring conceived the notion of an interagency bureaucracy. However, the 1947 National Security Act (NSA 47) formalized the National Security Council (NSC) system that is the foundation of the modern interagency process. Professor Pendleton, of Harvard University, proposed a foreign policymaking process that placed military advisors at the top levels of government in times of both war and peace.”⁹

During WWII, it became evident that national security required a system to manage the growing responsibilities and complexities of the United States Government in a crisis. Secretary of War Henry Stimson articulated the military’s need to unify the services’ efforts as “triphibious warfare where the armed forces could no longer afford to think or act in isolation from each other.”¹⁰ Post war conditions extended this unity of effort concept further through the reconstruction of Europe. The Marshal Plan and the Economic Cooperation Administration utilized the specialties from agencies such as Treasury, Agriculture, Justice, and Labor while calling upon the military to provide security and an authoritative presence.¹¹ NSA 47 unified the military effort while simultaneously establishing the National Security Council (NSC) and Central Intelligence

⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-08, v.

⁹ Douglas Stuart, Organizing for National Security, (Strategic Studies Institute; Carlisle, PA; November 2000), 8.

¹⁰ Ibid., 11.

¹¹ Hadley Arkes, Bureaucracy, the Marshal Plan, and the National Interest, (Princeton University Press; Princeton, 1972), 228-229.

Agency (CIA). The NSC advised the President on foreign affairs while also providing a critical bridge between the executive bureaucracy and the intelligence structure.

Changes to NSA 47 have been implemented since its inception, however, the statutory members of the NSC remain the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) providing advice to the council. The NSC is the most senior interagency organization responsible "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."¹² The interagency process consists of hierarchical groups and committees that serve as the source for the advice the NSC ultimately gives the President.

As the principal advisor to the President on security issues, the NSC functions as the key cog in the interagency process. Participants at the national level of the interagency process develop policy along a hierarchical bureaucratic structure. Participants in National Security Council System assemble in the following councils, committees, and groups:

- National Security Council
- Principals Committee
- Deputies Committee

¹² National Security Council, Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 13, 1998). Internet accessed [http://www.pdd56.com/handbook_alt.htm], on April 2, 2001.

- Interagency Working Group
- Working Groups¹³

Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Department of State, and CIA provide the majority of national security inputs. Other components of the government including the United States Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Attorney General, and various United States departments and agencies ranging from Agriculture to Transportation may provide input depending on the issue. This diversified assembly of participants provides the President the opportunity to develop policy with extensive input and expertise from the whole administration. The downside of diversity is the possibility of multiple objectives and the probability of bureaucratic cultural differences, both of which can distort, disrupt, and delay the decision-making process.

The Principals Committee and Deputies Committee consist of the cabinet secretary, under secretary, or senior ranking member of the agency. The CJCS is a member of the Principals Committee and the VCJCS is a member of the Deputies Committee. The senior government officials of these committees refine policy before the President makes a decision. Groups organized on an ad hoc basis, however, conduct the background work and research for policy development.

Critical to the development of policy is the Interagency Working Group (IWG). The IWG can respond to a specific crisis or may develop long-term strategies. Additionally, working groups carry out the daily responsibilities of particular policy issues.¹⁴ The composition of the IWG can vary from the action or desk officer to a

¹³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-08, II-3.

¹⁴ Ibid.

deputy assistant secretary. Regardless of position or title, the IWG brings together a diverse body of advisors. The IWG's objective is to leverage the diverse experience while overcoming the difference in perspectives and positions of the bureaucratic entities involved. Trust, familiarity, and communication are qualities that contribute to the success of IWGs.

Interagency at the Operational and Tactical Levels

Although the interagency model "is the established process for coordinating executive branch decision making," cooperation of government agencies at all levels of authority is essential to national security.¹⁵ The requirement to coordinate the activities of government agencies is applicable to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command. The NSC through several layers of executive committees and working groups applies the process at the national strategic level, while theater Commander's in Chief (CINCs) and Joint Task Force Commanders exercise the process through interagency operations at the operational and tactical level.¹⁶

Interagency activities and participants at the operational and tactical levels differ significantly from the strategic level. The national level interagency process is a bureaucratic system designed to "formulate, recommend, coordinate and monitor the implementation of national security policy and strategy."¹⁷ At the operational level Theater CINCs are "responsible to coordinate with multiple United States government agencies to overcome regional stability."¹⁸ The dilemma is, "no regional or operational-

¹⁵ National Security Council, Handbook for Interagency Management.

¹⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-08, v.

¹⁷ William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency Cooperation. A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, McNair Paper no. 44(Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1995), 14.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

level body exists, which is charged with supporting and coordinating the various mandates generated at the national level.”¹⁹ Theater CINCs develop policies to coordinate available assets as a method to accomplish specific national strategies in a particular region. For example, United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) theater strategy states, “USCENTCOM must closely coordinate its programs with other United States and coalition government, non-government, and international agencies to enhance synergy and efficiently achieve desired goals.”²⁰

While the IWG at the national level addresses broad, overarching policy issues, Theater CINCs cope with the development of a plan to support theater specific objectives. Parallel to USCENTCOM’s Theater Strategy, the USEUCOM Strategy of Preparedness and Engagement in Africa states, “the strategy seeks to create a new synergism based on interagency synchronization within the United States government.”²¹ In addition to the specific mission in El Salvador, USSOUTHCOM has identified a peacetime engagement plan, which relies on significant interagency assistance in four programs, Nation Assistance, Promote Democracy, Military Roles and Counterdrug.²² Interagency operations extend across the full spectrum of conflict and require all government organizations within the area of operations to coordinate efforts.

Strategies and plans do not necessarily ensure coordination and cooperation of government agencies. One former United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

¹⁹ Gibbings, 101.

²⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, “Central Command’s Theater Strategy,” (U.S. Central Command: Tampa, 2001). Internet accessed [http://www.centcom.mil/theater_strat/theater_strat.htm] on January 19, 2001.

²¹ U.S. Department of Defense, “Strategy of Preparedness and Engagement in Africa,” (Germany: U.S. Europe Command, 2001). Internet accessed [<http://www.eucom.mil/africa/publications/strategy.htm>.] on January 19, 2001.

²² Mendel, 29-32.

CINCs addressed the interagency issue by stating, "we have a strategy which supports the ambassadors in the region. The issue is who are the players and can they cooperate."²³ The uncertainty of which agencies are engaged in theater operations illustrates the disjointed effort between government organizations at the operational and tactical level.

Although tactical commanders experience many of the same problems as the theater CINC, a specified mission in a defined area of operations allows for greater chance of success. A successful counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador (1980-1992) was accomplished, in a large part, through interagency operations that involved the United States Ambassador's Country Team, the United States Military Group (MILGP), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The effort exemplifies the possibility of success given the right conditions, players and unified action. The combined effort of Special Operation Forces, conventional soldiers, humanitarians, and diplomats overcame the initial disharmony through "leadership, trust, shared experiences, and the nature of the conflict itself."²⁴

Interagency operations leverage military and non-military resources to provide the commander with diverse options and enhancements for the execution of national policy. Organizational structures and systems can assist the military planner when confronted with interagency issues. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) is a common instrument employed by the military to coordinate with government agencies. Although the CMOC facilitates interagency operations, one perspective is that "commanders use

²³ George A. Joulwan, General U.S. Army, interview by William W. Mendel, Quarry Heights Panama, 8 April 1993, in Mendel, 26.

²⁴ Scott W. Moore, "Today it's Gold, Not Purple," Joint Forces Quarterly, Institute for National Strategic Studies, (Autumn/Winter 1998-99): 102.

the CMOC to sideline rather than expand civil-military cooperation.²⁵ Regardless of its legitimacy, this perception is detrimental to the interagency effort. Interagency success in the future requires a method to avert these perceptions and build positive civil-military relations prior to theater operations

The Interagency Effort

Mutual trust and understanding are essential to interagency success whether applied to an IWG, Theater CINC, or MILGRP commander. The significant difference between interagency operations and joint military operations is the people involved. The military unifies the different service members through common perspective. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act provided the necessary direction for the military to organize and operate jointly. No legislation exists to unify government agencies; therefore, interagency cooperation must be a function of a shared trust and confidence.

The military developed joint doctrine to address the problems and intricacies of interagency coordination. Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I, provides the military planner detailed guidance on “the interagency process, the players, and the evolving role of the Armed Forces.”²⁶ A thorough document, JP 3-08 touches upon interagency challenges and provides the doctrinal solution to overcoming identified problems. The problem JP 3-08 does not resolve is that joint doctrine is only applicable to the military. It is unlikely that the various governmental agencies require personnel to read JP3-08. It is more likely that each agency has its own procedures and guidance for conducting interagency operations.

²⁵ John MacKinlay, A Guide to Peace Support Operations, (Providence, R.I.: Brown Univ. Press, 1996), 240-41, in Gibbins, 102.

²⁶ William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, “Interagency Cooperation, PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations, Joint Forces Quarterly, (Spring 2000), 92.

Lack of military experience within governmental agencies further exacerbates the differences. Veterans from WWII found themselves employed throughout the government. In 2000 Congressional members with prior military service dropped below 50% for the first time in 50 years.²⁷ The cultural difference based upon military experience is more than time in service, it accounts for the warrior ethos. General Zinni in his retirement speech summed up this difference,

Today we are suffering through the agony of watching and waiting for our political masters and the American people to decide what the U.S. military should look like in the future. It is especially agonizing because the political leaders—and the population in general—have very little association with the armed forces. Consequently, they have very little awareness of how we function.²⁸

Chapter Summary

The forecast of future operations calls for significant interagency operations. As the United States reduces force structure and increases its global commitments, Theater CINCs and Ambassadors will be more reliant on interagency operations. Theater CINCs are developing their interagency resources while government agency personnel are finding military cooperation as part of their job description. The degree of success for interagency cooperation relies on an essential factor, the amount of trust that exists between the various government agencies. How to foster an interagency relationship and build this essential trust is the basis of this research.

²⁷ Shelley Davis, Veterans in Congress *Veterans in Congress*, (March 1999). Internet accessed [<http://www.troa.org/Magazine/March1999/veterans.htm>] on February 22, 2001.

²⁸ Anthony C. Zinni, General, U.S. Marine Corps, "A Commander Reflects," in The Defence Associations National Network National Network News, (Summer, 2000). Internet accessed [http://www.sfu.ca/~dann/nn7-2_4.htm] on February 14, 2001.

CHAPTER THREE

The UCP, JSO and JPME

Interagency challenges resemble some of the problems confronted by the military in the years following World War II (WWII). One interagency problem identified in the PDD-56 White Paper was the lack of “established management practices to achieve unity of effort among government agencies.”²⁹ Decades earlier in 1946 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) articulated the need to establish “a single command over the entire Pacific Theater (excluding Japan, Korea, and China), whose commander would have a joint staff and would exercise unity of command.”³⁰ The military command structure in the Pacific following WWII was characterized as “ambiguous” and “unsatisfactory.”³¹ Likewise, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke found the interagency process “too cumbersome and time consuming” for the fast-moving negotiations of the 1995 Bosnian peace process.³² The Department of Defense has significantly improved the unified military effort over the past 50 years. This chapter examines the evolution of joint military operations as a possible model to improve interagency coordination. Specific legislative actions and educational programs illustrate the effectiveness of the joint military staff.

Legislation and the Unified Effort

Post WWII expectations for national security varied among United States government and military officials. The need to clearly establish civilian authority and the inability of

²⁹ National Security Council, “Handbook for Interagency Management,” A-3.

³⁰ Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson and Willard J. Webb, Joint History Office, The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing, 1993), 11.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Richard Holbrook, To End a War (The Modern Library; New York, 1998), 171.

the services to resolve parochial differences prompted legislative efforts and the National Security Act of 1947. Coordination of the peacetime military required a structure independent of any single service and responsive to a collective national security strategy. The 1947 National Security Act accomplished these objectives through a reorganized defense structure. This legislation unified the defense structure of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps along with the newly established Air Force under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and civilian leadership from service secretaries and a cabinet level Secretary of Defense.³³ The 1947 National Security Act initiated a series of legislative actions aimed at coordination of national powers to provide a more effective and efficient national security structure.

While national level assets were organized under the National Security Act, the Joints Chiefs of Staff conducted parallel planning on areas to improve the organizational development within the military. Initial unification efforts of the military began in 1946 when President Truman approved the "Outline Command Plan," which established seven global unified commands, Far East Command, Pacific Command, Alaskan Command, Northeast Command, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean Command, and European Command.³⁴ This plan, which came to be known as the Unified Command Plan (UCP), provided a foundation for the evolving military structure, but service indifference and the changing strategic environment required modification in the plan and reorganization of the military.

³³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Overview of National Security Structure," (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 2000). Internet accessed [<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/> - Joint Chiefs of Staff] February 25, 2001.

³⁴ Cole, 12.

Analysis of modifications to the UCP and legislative reforms to the defense structure provides more historical data. Although the following is not a comprehensive examination of changes to the UCP or Department of Defense reforms, the selected material illustrates the adaptability of an organizational structure and the importance of legislation. The first modification of the UCP came about in 1948 due to ambiguous roles and missions of the services. The significance of these first changes was the indication that CINCs needed to be empowered to affect change in the unified command structure. "The JCS assigned responsibility to the Unified CINCs for joint planning at the theater level . . . to be accomplished for all three United States Military Services, and include plans for the employment of such other forces as may be available."³⁵ Subsequent changes in the UCP were mainly responsive measures to a changing political and security environment. Throughout the 1950s, a wide range of changes to the UCP included removal of South Korea from CINCFE, removal of CINCEUR's requirement to maintain reserve forces and the assignment of responsibility for coordinating Arctic airways to CINCAL and CINCNE.³⁶ These organizational changes reflect the global focus the JCS began to develop. Additionally unified commanders begin to discharge their duties in support of national security.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 implemented significant changes to the defense structure. The President exercised control of the military through the Secretary of Defense and executed through unified and specified commands.³⁷ The JCS, now autonomous from theater operational planning, focused on strategic issues to provide

³⁵ Ibid., 16.

³⁶ Cole, 19.

³⁷ Ibid., 28

advice to the president and SECDEF from a global perspective. This change also led to the concept of parallel planning, a mechanism that continues to be critical to the planning process. Additionally, legislation discontinued the designation of service chiefs as executive agents for unified commands.

Originally, United States involvement in Vietnam did not meet the unity of command objective outlined in law. The sub-unified command, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established to coordinate military support activities in South Vietnam. Unity was lost as CINCPAC assumed responsibility for air operations against North Vietnam and MACV controlled South Vietnam operations.³⁸ The intent of a theater CINC responsible for all forces assigned to his AO was circumvented as General Westmoreland received direction to "send communications direct and undiluted to Washington."³⁹ MACV and General Westmoreland may have been best situated to command and control United States forces but the intent of the UCP deteriorated as MACV assumed more authority and took on the multifunctional role. The nature of the Cold War influenced the evolution of joint forces command as significantly as the previous armed conflicts. The Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese threats caused great concern for the JCS over unassigned areas of the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Asia.⁴⁰ United States interests in the oil producing Gulf region dictated that the UCP address responsibility for this area. During this period, the Joint Task Force appears in

³⁸ Arthur T. Frame, LTC USA (Ret), "Unity of Command," Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939 (material not copyrighted, reprinted by special permission), reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, Joint Force Command, Syllabus/Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, November 1999), p. M4-1-2.

³⁹ Bruce Palmer, General, The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam, (Touchstone, New York, 1984), p.30.

⁴⁰ Cole, 65

response to problems, not directly associated with a unified command. Most notable is the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to respond primarily to the Middle East as a sub-unified command of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) or U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM).

As the Joint Task Force concept evolved two operations led to legislation, which redefined the joint structure. Operation Eagle Claw formed JTF 1-79 for the rescue of United States hostages held at the embassy in Iran. Mission failure and the disaster at Desert One called for a formal investigation. The Holloway Commission, charged with the investigation reported, "Command relationships below the JTF level were not clearly emphasized."⁴¹ At the strategic level JCS was fully capable of standing up and employing an ad hoc task force, but at the tactical level the joint concept was not fully developed to carry out complex operations with minimal coordination of assets. The U.S. opted for the JTF option again in response to the Grenada situation of 1983. Operation Urgent Fury stood up CJTF 120 as a sub-unified command assigned to USCINCLANT. Both JTF 1-79 and CJTF 120 demonstrated the successful evolution of a joint command at the strategic level but operational and tactical command and control was flawed.

Two important pieces of legislation to the evolution of joint forces command were the new UCP of 1983 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The 1983 UCP shaped the geographic responsibilities of theater CINCs similar to today's theaters. While the

⁴¹ Anno, Stephen Col and William Einspahr, Lt Col. "The Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt," Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned (Air War College), reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, Joint Force Command, Syllabus/Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, November 1999), p.M5-1-2.

UCP extended EUCOM and PACOM AOs, the most significant change was the designated responsibility of the newly formed CENTCOM Theater.⁴²

Goldwater-Nichols Act and Education

The United States had been on a path to unifying the efforts of its military for almost 40 years when Senator Goldwater and Senator Nichols championed the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The intent of Goldwater-Nichols was to balance joint and service interests with a focus on eight concepts: civilian authority, military advice, clear responsibility, commensurate authority, strategy making and planning, resource use, joint officer management, and operational and DoD administrative effectiveness.⁴³ The aim of this legislation was to synchronize military action through an established joint structure. One concept of Goldwater-Nichols that demonstrated significant improvement from previous legislative actions was the development of human resources.

The Baxter Board in 1955 and an ad hoc committee from the National War College recognized the necessity for professional military education (PME), but not until 1982 was education emphasized as an improvement to the joint military system.⁴⁴ Five separate studies refined The Joint Professional Military Education Policy issued in 1984:

- The Dougherty Board on Senior Military Education – 1987
- The Rostow-Endicott Assessment on the Teaching of Strategy and Foreign Policy at the Senior War Colleges – 1987

⁴² Cole, 85.

⁴³ James R. Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Force Quarterly (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1996), reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, Joint Force Command, Syllabus/Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, November 1999), p.M6-1-1.

⁴⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, A-A-1.

- The Morgan Initial Certification Group – 1989
- The National Defense University Transition Planning Committee – 1989
- Skelton Panel on Military Education – 1987 to 1989 ⁴⁵

Each of the studies made significant findings that greatly contributed to the JPME system. Important to this project, however, was the incentive to conduct five studies within three years. This abrupt interest in PME on behalf of the government illustrates the importance of education to the development of joint staff officers.

An important quality of the twenty-first century United States military is that it is a highly educated force. Specifically, professional military education (PME) “entails the systematic instruction of professionals in subjects enhancing their knowledge of the science and art of war.”⁴⁶ The military officer’s career path, regardless of service, includes formal education ranging from tactical operations to strategic theory. Within the PME framework Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) programs provide for further development of the officer’s knowledge. “JPME programs provide [officers] with an understanding of strategic concepts in the future environment where military force will be applied, as well as in-depth understanding of individual Service systems and how the integration of these systems enhance joint operations.”⁴⁷

Joint Professional Military Education

The Goldwater-Nichols Act recognized that service culture loyalties still existed and continued to thwart the unification of the armed forces. To overcome the cultural

⁴⁵ Ibid., A-A-1 – A-A-2.

⁴⁶ Ibid., A-B-1.

⁴⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, Vision for Professional Military Education, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999). Internet accessed [<http://www.dtic.mil/mil-ed/index.html>] on February 6, 2001.

differences between the services the legislation outlined requirements to develop joint specialty officers (JSO) who were cognizant of service needs and capabilities, but knowledgeable of joint military requirements. Educational requirements outlined in the CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) require JSO and JSO nominees to complete a certified JPME program. The educational requirements are accomplished through attendance of a service college for Phase I and Joint Forces Staff College. Full JPME credit is acquired through attendance of either the National War College (NWC) or Industrial College of the Armed Forces.⁴⁸ The establishment of the JPME process illustrates the commitment of civilian and military leadership to resolve the unification of the military problem through a systematic educational process.

The Department of Defense is required by law to educate military officers in a joint environment and ensure a minimum of 20 percent attendance of military students at each war college to be from military departments other than hosting military department.⁴⁹ The service initially resisted the qualifying of JSOs for joint duty assignments. An understanding of the value from joint officers was slowly recognized and services improved on qualification of JSOs over the last eight years. As an example, in 1993, the US Army Command and General Staff College could not place a sea service representative (Navy or USMC) in each of the small group seminars.⁵⁰ In the year 2001, the responsiveness of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to JPME

⁴⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, A-B-A-1.

⁴⁹ Declaratory Judgment Act, Pub. L. 104-208, div. A, title I, Sec. 101(b) (title VIII, Sec. 8069), (Sept. 30, 1996). Internet accessed [http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftpl.cgi?IPaddress=wais.access.gpo.gov&filename=publ208.104&directory=/diskc/wais/data/104_cong_public_laws] April 3, 2001.

⁵⁰ Ike Skelton, "JPME: Are We There Yet?" Military Review, (Ft. Leavenworth: Military Review, Jan/Feb 1997), 98. Internet accessed [<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/janfeb97/skelton.htm>] February 12, 2001.

requirements is a result of legislative mandates, but the services also understand the benefits of jointly educated officers assigned to joint headquarters. National Defense Fellow, Lieutenant Colonel Katherine Brown describes the new environment as “jointness - a combined “culture” which draws strength from the blending of multi-service perspectives and from integrating service capabilities.”⁵¹ Through the JPME system officers received exposure to other services and developed an understanding of a joint military culture. However, competition still exists and continues to divide services. This is obvious in the Quadrennial Defense Review or any other procurement matter which involves competition for defense dollars.

Civilian and military leadership endorse JPME as a method for the development of joint officers. The research and development of curriculums at intermediate and senior level colleges provides for service specific development of the officer as well as the preparation of the JSO for joint duty assignment. Congressman Ike Skelton realized that “officers of all four services at the major/lieutenant commander and lieutenant colonel/commander ranks should have an understanding, if not expertise, in multi-service matters – jointness.”⁵² His efforts combined with legislation institutionalized JPME as a component of the OPMEP. As the military concentrates its efforts to respond with the best-combined package of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine assets, the position of the JSO and JPME has become more relevant to national security.

⁵¹ Katherine L. Brown, Lt Col, “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization act, 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management.” (National Defense Fellow Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, GPO, June 1, 2000), 40. Internet accessed [<http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/projects/ay2000/affp/brown.pdf>] on March 26, 2001.

⁵² Skelton, 96.

Chapter Summary

The organization of the post WWII peacetime military was a national security problem the United States faced. Problems throughout the war identified the need for United States to organize its military under a unified command structure. However, competition between the services for forces and missions complicated the task of unifying the military. Ultimately the newly established Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a plan to "create an organizational scheme that would centralize control without impinging upon what the services saw as their basic roles and functions."⁵³

Legislation played an important role in the development of an organizational regional structure to address global threats and challenges. One of the first steps to unify the military was to assign a single United States military commander responsible for development of plans and employment of forces. Laws such as the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 helped build the modern organizational framework. Although legislation ensured the military's compliance in the establishment of a unified command system with joint staff resources, the professional development of the human resources assigned to these joint staffs was not a principal issue until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

One focus of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was career management of the Joint Specialty Officer and assignment to joint duty. The years 1947-1986 had failed to aggressively educate and develop the joint officer. However, provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act accounted for the education deficiency and assigned the CJCS responsibility for the educational development of officers designated to serve in joint

⁵³ Cole, 1.

duty assignments. Revision to the professional military education system included joint professional military education (JPME).

As the military enters the twenty-first century, JPME is an important part of the development of a leader's career. JPME has been indoctrinated into the educational development of all military officers. Officers designated to be JSOs receive focused education on specific joint issues. Through JPME, the military has been able to build a corps of officers equipped with the joint knowledge and experience. Additionally the joint educational system fosters a harmonious relationship between services that facilitates interoperability.

This single purpose and esprit de corps has not always been the case for the United States military. The military has made great accomplishments in the unified effort and joint operations. Although unity of command and coordination of forces remains a difficult and complex problem, some lessons can apply to dealing with disjointed efforts in the interagency process. Legislation plays an instrumental part in direction of government activities. Individuals, who are trained and educated on the complete process, facilitate unity of effort. The educational tool used to unify the military effort can also enhance interagency coordination.

CHAPTER FOUR

Education and the Interagency Effort

*How can you get very far,
If you don't know Who You Are?
How can you do what you ought,
If you don't know What You've Got?
And if you don't know Which To Do,
Of all the things in front of you,
Then what you'll have when you are through
Is just a mess without a clue
Of all the best that can come true
If you know What and Which and Who.*

--From *The Tao of Pooh*⁵⁴

Benjamin Hoff's *The Tao of Pooh* offers sound advice for future interagency planners. Problems associated with interagency coordination can be avoided by knowing who the interagency players are, what interagency assets are available, and which tasks can be accomplished through interagency operations. Improperly coordinated, interagency operations may produce a "mess without a clue." The operative word in Hoff's poem is "know." Through knowledge, interagency questions can be answered, the effort coordinated, and the task can be accomplished without a mess. Knowledge, however, requires the establishment of an educational system to professionally develop interagency personnel. A task from PDD-56 is for the NSC and State Department to coordinate with USG educational institutions to develop interagency training programs as

⁵⁴ Benjamin Hoff, *The Tao of Pooh* (New York; Penguin Books, 1982), p.58. in "Peace(keeping) in Our Time: The UN as a Professional Military Manager," *Parameters* (Carlisle; USAC, Autumn 1996), p.17. Internet accessed [<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96Autumn/hillen.htm>] on April 2, 2001.

well as the incorporation of the political-military planning process into curriculums.⁵⁵

This chapter examines interagency education as a method to develop qualified individuals capable of exercising interagency operations. By applying the military's JPME concept and the management of joint specialty officers a curriculum and academic program can be developed to support interagency operations.

The Future of Interagency Operations

An investment in the education of interagency personnel is a necessary step in the future of United States national security. Future national security concerns will rely on the synergistic effort of all government resources. Threats to national security may not require the traditional military response, but the military may be called upon as a supporting element in a broader interagency response. In the book, The Coming Anarchy Robert Kaplan contends that future challenges to be met are foreshadowed through a description of West Africa that entails "disease, over-population, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations and the erosion of nation states."⁵⁶ As these West African-type problems appear in nations throughout the world, United States interests will be threatened. The potential adverse impact on national interests requires that the United States must prepare the appropriate agencies to respond to these problems in a coordinated, efficient, and effective manner.

Phase II of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century believes that "traditional national security agencies (State, Defense, CIA, NSC staff) will need to work together in new ways, and economic agencies (Treasury, Commerce, U.S.

⁵⁵ National Security Council, "The Clinton administration's policy on managing complex contingency operations."

⁵⁶ Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, (Random House; New York, 2000), 7.

Trade Representative) will need to work closely with the national security community.”⁵⁷

The interagency response to domestic national security issues is found in the approved and coordinated Federal Response Plan. The Federal Response Plan is a coordinated effort of twenty-nine government agencies to “provide federal assistance to augment the efforts of local and state governments in responding to disaster or emergency.”⁵⁸

Although the domestic interagency response may involve many of the same agencies as an interagency operation overseas, the constraints and restraints of the process widely differ due to the difference between domestic and international laws. There are no interagency coordination mechanisms similar to the Federal Response Plan to address national security threats overseas.

PDD-56 provides the most recent guidance on coordination of planning and executing interagency operations. A March 1999 review of the PDD indicated three areas for improvement:

1. Greater authority and leadership to promote PDD-56
2. More flexible and less detailed political-military planning
3. Dedicated training resources and greater outreach

The aim of the third area for improvement was to develop within interagency personnel competencies necessary to successful execution. The solution to this problem is through an inclusive and regimented training program. The education of personnel to develop a competent interagency plan and execution process, however, appears to have fallen

⁵⁷ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change. The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 15, 2001), 101.

⁵⁸ U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Federal Response Plan, Basic Brief,” updated March 1998. Brief provided by FEMA to US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, on March 17, 2001.

through the cracks in the system. If future national security policies are to rely on interagency operations, then long term development of informed and knowledgeable people will be required to plan and execute operations in support of United States responses.

Training and Education

Frequently education is considered part of the overall training program. Education and training, however, are not interchangeable terms. Each plays a different and essential role in the development of individuals. Interagency training has been identified as critical to coordinate interagency operations. Interagency education is equally important, but rarely referred to in literature. To differentiate between education and training Joint Publication 1-02 provides useful definitions:

- **Military education**--The systematic instruction of individuals in subjects, which will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war.
- **Military training**--The instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks; the exercise of one or more military units conducted to enhance their combat readiness.⁵⁹

The training concept as a measure to enhance interagency coordination is incorporated into several government agencies. However, training is a short-term solution to a deficiency in a unit or individual readiness. The Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations details the training course mandated by PDD-56. This interagency training course administered by the Foreign Service Institute, National Defense University, and United States Army War College is limited to

three days of instruction and is not expected to cover all aspects of political-military planning.⁶⁰ Typical of the training, individuals are exposed to interagency issues, but seldom have the time to work out detailed coordination issues such as civilian-military cultural and doctrine differences.

Training is an important tool to prepare units and individuals for execution of interagency operations. Likewise, education provides the knowledge base necessary for agencies and the government to further develop the interagency response. The importance of education and training to the development of a corps of professionals is exemplified through the joint specialty officer (JSO) and JPME system. An additional benefit of education is the long-term effect of breaking down the cultural, doctrinal, and procedural barriers, which exists, in no small measure, due to the ignorance of outside institutions or agencies. A shared educational environment builds a sense of trust and confidence among the student body that is essential to the interagency process from strategic to tactical level. William Mendel and David Bradford authors of Interagency Cooperation, A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, conclude that "turf issues will continue as a dominating factor in the quest for interagency cooperation and integration, but they can be overcome by civilian and military leadership."⁶¹

A Proposed Interagency Educational Model

It has been demonstrated that JPME is essential to the coordination of a joint military effort. Education can enhance interagency coordination as well, but unlike the

⁵⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 23, 1994 amended January 10, 2000), 186-189.

⁶⁰ National Security Council, Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations, E-2.

⁶¹ Mendel, 4.

military, an educational framework has not been established. The PME framework is a product of multiple commissions, assigned to evaluate and develop a system and its curriculum. Additionally, the educational system must be flexible and responsive to national security needs. JPME development has had the luxury of building from a foundation already present in the PME system. Establishment of a system for interagency education (IE), however, does not necessarily suggest that new schools should be built and faculties hired to instruct an entirely new curriculum. At the time of this study, United States Government resources exist that can facilitate the development of IE.

The United States has at its disposal an existing structure responsible for providing educational resources. The CJCS directs "the Services and NDU to provide PME to uniformed members of the United States Armed Forces, international officers, eligible Federal Government Civilians, and other approved students."⁶² PME is a continual process during a military officer's career. The JPME as a component of PME is directed towards military officers in the grades of O-4 through O-6. A majority of the officers will attend one of the intermediate-level college (ILC) and/or the senior-level colleges (SLC). IE can capitalize on the accessibility of these student bodies. Rather than create a new institution IE can be incorporated into the PME system similar to the introduction of JPME. Current curriculums and student/faculty can be modified at NDU, ICAF, and senior and intermediate service colleges to meet the needs of IE.

Interagency issues are already addressed within the JPME learning areas, however the priority of the Service colleges is on military education. The Joint Forces Staff

⁶² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, A-1.

College (JFSC) and National War College through JPME Phase II have the potential to provide better resolution on interagency issues. The JFSC mission states, “. . . educate staff officers and other leaders in joint operational-level planning and warfighting in order to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives.”⁶³ As interagency cooperation becomes more important to the success of the military operations, adjustment of the educational curriculum will be required to meet national security concerns. Incorporation of IE into the PME is not intended to replace service or joint educational learning objectives. To ensure national security requirements are satisfied the periodic reviews of the educational system should consider modification to the PME and JPME curriculums. The Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMED) dated December 2000, directs the educational institutions to address the interagency issue. An element of Learning Area 1 for the intermediate level colleges of each service is “comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.”⁶⁴

This objective however, only examines the interagency issue from the organizational perspective. A learning area objective for the Joint Forces Staff College requires, “Apply the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy to the conduct of campaign/theater planning, joint force development and the integration of joint, multinational, and interagency resources during strategy execution.”⁶⁵ This objective, which should apply to all of the institutions, addresses planning and integration

⁶³ Ibid., E-F-1.

⁶⁴ Ibid., E-B-1.

⁶⁵ Ibid., E-F-2.

issues, but without representation of government agencies within the student body and faculty the military planning process will only be reinforced. Service colleges can strengthen curriculums through instruction of specific rather than general interagency issues. The elective system of the colleges allows a few students to select a course that entails instruction on basic interagency principles. Modification to core curriculums and student/faculty mix, however, can ensure all students receive specific interagency planning and execution instruction as outlined in resources such as the Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingencies or Interagency Cooperation, A Regional Model for Overseas Operations.

Modification to JPME or a parallel curriculum can produce highly educated personnel with an increased capability for interagency planning and execution. A function of JPME Phase II is to reinforce the JSO's knowledge base in order to build a corps of officers with the knowledge base to command and organize joint forces. The interagency process can benefit by building a corps of educated professionals from the advanced educational programs in interagency operations, similar to JPME Phase II. The advanced IE programs would be designed to produce educated personnel for assignment to positions within government agencies that require interagency planning and execution. Such positions may be designated at various IWG or Theater CINC planning staffs. The problem now becomes the method of creating, maturing, and tracking this specialized corps of professionals.

Education can be coordinated through DoD to incorporate a specific IE curriculum at NDU and Service colleges. The student body, however, should be a representation of the interagency process. CJCS requires a designated student and

faculty mix of service representation for institutions providing JPME instruction. This requirement ensures that classroom instruction will benefit from a multi-service and interagency perspective from students and faculty. An IE program would require a concerted effort from all participating agencies. It is not enough to have an educational curriculum covering the interagency process; success of the interagency process rests in the trust and confidence between agency personnel. It is difficult to foster a trusting relationship between individuals who have been trained for ten years or more from within their own culture. The educational experience provides an atmosphere for student exposure to new cultures and ways of thinking. Agency participation in the IE program also creates a common frame of reference as a start point. The student body upon completion of the curriculum returns to their respective government agencies with a common understanding of the interagency process. This common understanding is essential in the initial stages of interagency operations where operational and philosophical differences separate agencies.”⁶⁶ A shared experience in the classroom helps develop a corps of civilian and military professionals who thoroughly understand the interagency process. As the JSO is educated through the JPME, the interagency professional can be educated through IE.

Supporting Concepts

PDD-56 demonstrated a concern of the government’s leadership for the coordination of agency activities. Increases in interagency training opportunities and facilities also indicate that the civilian and military decision-makers realize the need to develop a working relationship among government agencies. The DoD PME system, however, does not reflect the same amount of interest in enhancing interagency

⁶⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operation, v.

cooperation. United States government agencies should be attentive to previous studies, which indicate the need for interagency education. Most significant of these studies is *The United States Commission on National Security / 21st Century*, which should have significant impact on all government agencies. One conclusion of this commission was “the national security component of the Civil Service calls for professionals with breadth of experience in the interagency process and with depth of knowledge about policy issues.”⁶⁷ The recommendation of this commission was “the establishment of a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) to broaden the experience base of senior departmental managers and develop leaders who seek integrative solutions to national security policy problems.”⁶⁸ The conclusion and recommendation of this commission supports the concept of developing a knowledge base among key participants of the interagency process. In support of the commission’s proposal of a NSSC, the PME and JPME systems could integrate an IE curriculum to be instructed by a combined agency faculty to a combined student body.

The Defense Leadership Management Program (DLAMP) is a systematic approach to provide training and education to civilian leaders over a period of six to seven years with intent to “foster an environment that nurtures a shared understanding and sense of mission among civilian and military personnel.”⁶⁹ A DoD program, DLAMP is for DoD personnel in permanent positions at the level of GS/GM 13-15.⁷⁰ This program, which “applies the developmental principles of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to the civilian

⁶⁷ The United States Commission on National Security, xvi.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, “Program Overview” Defense Leadership and Management Program (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001). Internet accessed [http://www.cpmosd.mil/dlamp/about_overview.html] on April 5, 2001.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

workforce” supports the theory of extending the PME and JPME framework to support an IE curriculum. A portion of the DLAMP curriculum includes “senior level PME courses the NDU or a senior service school.”⁷¹ The program, implemented in 1996 is only beginning to put people in key positions. DoD with over 300 DLAMP graduates, has designated over 3,000 appropriate positions, and continues to enroll approximately 350 students in each class.⁷² Success of the DLAMP does not guarantee success of IE, however, implementation of the program and greater participation indicates DoD’s support for education as a bridge for the cultural gap between military and civilian counterparts.

The Bureaucratic Problem

The IE concept outlined above appears to be the straightforward, common sense approach to resolving an organizational problem. The distinction, however, is the organization is the United States government. The rules that Corporate America abides by do not apply to the inner workings of Washington. Political agendas and the bureaucracy have the capability to overcome any rational decision. The article, “Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can’t Ignore” by Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore details the organizational behavior problems that would prevent multiple government agencies reaching a consensus to coordinate educational efforts. “Organizations tend to protect themselves by distributing power and responsibility for making decisions among various internal mini-bureaucracies.”⁷³ Organizational and structural changes to government agencies are threatening actions that

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Gibbings,

require protective measures. The proposed change for the educational development of agency personnel may be perceived as a potential threat. As a survival mechanism agencies may undermine the IE concept in order to retain complete authority to train and educate its personnel.

The reduction of human resources within the government also presents potential problems to the proposed IE concept. Downsizing is common to all government agencies. An insufficient number of personnel do not support the concept of assignments to educational institutions for extended periods of education. Government agencies are over-tasked and under-manned and therefore often place a low priority on educational billets.

These are real problems for government. The United States system of government creates bureaucracies and while current economic conditions do not support government and military employment opportunities. Regardless of these problems, the interagency process is a component of our national security system and must be addressed. To ensure the process is effective political and agency agendas should be set aside and programs receive appropriate resources.

Chapter Summary

Professional development of government personnel is the responsibility of the employing agency. It is beneficial for government agencies to ensure their personnel receive appropriate training and education. Personnel cross-trained and educated in civil and military environments facilitate interagency coordination with DoD. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hahn, a member of the Army After Next Project and former program

manager of the Army Strategist Training Program, suggests five concepts that the United States Army should concern itself in the political education of its officers:

- Learning about politics best takes place in an educational environment, not at a training center
- Political education can not be left up to the individual pillar of the leader development system
- There's too much politics going around for it to be left up to the specialists . . . it is essential for all military officers to have a solid base of knowledge and skills from which they can draw when participating in the policy making arena.
- Professional military officers must develop a much more varied perspective on the art of politics . . . than can be achieved solely through the PME system.
- Military officers should not be afraid to share what they do know. An emphasis should be placed on developing civilian expertise in military affairs. . . .⁷⁴

These considerations apply equally to government agencies when considering the professional development of its personnel. Improvement of the military role in interagency coordination is a two-way process. A common perspective would greatly enhance interagency coordination with civil and military departments. A method to create and foster civil-military unity is through professional education. The current PME system is charged by law to provide education to military and select civilians. Adjustments to the existing JPME curriculum or development of a parallel interagency curriculum can provide the interagency focus necessary to accomplish civil-military synchronization. Synchronized efforts of the appropriate government agencies in support of national security are worth the cost of resources and time.

⁷⁴ Robert F. Hahn II, "Politics for Warriors: The Political Education of Professional Military Officers," (Boston: Harvard University, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1997) 25-26. Internet accessed [<http://data.fas.harvard.edu/cfia/olin/pubs/no12.htm>] on February 12, 2001.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

Summary

Reliance on all available national instruments of powers is vital to United States national security. Challenges to national security have changed from the peer competitor Soviet Union to an assortment of multi-dimensional threats ranging from famine in Western Africa to confrontation with a conventional military in Korea. The traditional military response to enforce United States foreign policy is not suitable for all of the challenges in the strategic environment of the twenty-first century. United States government agencies will be required to coordinate and cooperate to a greater degree than ever before to ensure national security.

Interagency operations entail the combined effort of two or more United States government agencies to achieve a common United States objective. The United States coordinates government agency activities through an established interagency process. The interagency process provides strategic decision-makers a mechanism for policy development, but little effort is placed in the coordination of interagency efforts at the operational and tactical levels.

The cultural, philosophical, doctrinal, and organizational differences among government agencies present problems to effective interagency coordination. Civil-military relation problems are compounded when one of the government agencies is the DoD, especially when the military is in a supporting role. The requirement to unify the efforts of all governmental components that are frequently in disagreement is not a new

problem to the military. The military wrestled with unity of effort and joint military operations problems since the end of WWII. Throughout the last fifty years, the military has come to realize that unity of command/effort is imperative to effective joint military operations. The fifty years, however, involved difficult lessons on how to achieve this unity. The military lessons from the development of a joint military organization can provide valuable suggestions for unifying the interagency effort.

A specific area of joint military development that may apply to the interagency effort is the professional education of interagency personnel. Professional military education structured towards joint military concepts provides military officers with a knowledge base to effectively plan and execute joint military operations. Joint professional military education (JPME) equips a corps of military officers with a knowledge base to be applied across all military services. Joint specialty officers who receive JPME have a common frame of reference to begin operational planning and execution. This common frame of reference is essential in overcoming the cultural differences and molding efficient and effective interagency operations.

To coordinate the interagency effort it would be useful to assign responsibilities to personnel who understand the intricacies of employing the capabilities of the different government agencies to achieve a common goal. Following the military lead developed in the JPME process, personnel educated in interagency operations can best serve this function. Additionally, the educational framework needed to support interagency education can be found within the military. The PME infrastructure was designed to provide education to military officers and select government civilians. DoD could fulfill the requirement to educate civilians through curriculums at National Defense University

and Service colleges that focused on the interagency process. Additional interagency education could be provided at Joint Forces Staff College and NDU to enhance the professional development of select interagency personnel. Empowered with a unique knowledge base, graduates from the interagency education system would be assigned positions that would facilitate the coordination of government agencies.

Conclusions

Professional interagency education can reduce the differences between agencies and improve coordination of efforts. The student body and faculty make-up is critical to the success of an interagency education program. Bureaucracies and political agendas may impede the development and implementation of an interagency program. However, the long-term benefits of interagency education facilitate the coordination of multiple elements of national power and ultimately strengthen national security.

Recommendations

A NSC-level commission should be convened with the purpose of investigating interagency education. Recommend studies be conducted into specific curriculum and student/faculty participation required establishing a framework for interagency education. As an interim solution recommend government agency involved with national security affairs consider assignment of personnel to service ILC/SLC and JFSC. In response to increased interagency operations recommend service ILC/SLC evaluate curriculums to provide substantial interagency education to students.

Finally, interagency education requires parallel efforts to coordinate the activities of government agencies. In addition to education, personnel require exposure to the operating environment. Military personnel likely to be involved with interagency issues

would benefit from a temporary assignment with a government agency. Likewise, agency personnel would gain appreciation for the military lifestyle through a similar assignment. Interagency training is improving, however, at the tactical level interoperability training would significantly enhance the education experience. Interagency issues discussed and taught in the learning environment could be played out in these exercises.

Improving interagency coordination will not be an easy task. The cooperation among agencies with requires trust and confidence, built over time. The collective effort of the government can be coordinated through a variety of methods. Knowledge, however, gained through education is one method aimed at improving the most important resource, people.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anno, Stephen Col and William Einspahr, Lt Col. "The Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt." Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned (Air War College). Reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, Joint Force Command, Syllabus/Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, November 1999), p.M5-1-2.
- Blechman, Barry M., Kevin P. O'Prey, and Renee Lajoie. "Grading Theater Engagement Planning." Joint Force Quarterly, no. 24 (2000): 98-103.
- Burn, A.R. Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic World, New England Edition. Collier Books: New York, 1962. Reprint, Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000.
- Brown, Katherine L., Lt Col. "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization act, 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management." National Defense Fellow Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, June 2000. Internet accessed [<http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/projects/ay2000/affp/brown.pdf>] on March 26, 2001.
- Clark, Wesley K., GEN, USA. "Ready for What?" Washington Post, September 8, 2000.
- _____. "Turning Point." Armed Forces Journal International, Guest Commentary (June 2000): 84+. Internet accessed, [http://www.afji.com/AFJI/Mags/2000/June/guest_commentary.html] on February 11, 2001.
- Cole, Ronald H., Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb. The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.
- Cucolo, Tony. "Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldiers." Parameters. US Army War College Quarterly. (Spring 1999): 110-26. Internet accessed, January 19, 2001, [<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99spring/cucolo.htm>], on November 13, 2000.
- Davis, Shelley. "Veterans in Congress." Veterans in Congress, (March 1999). Internet accessed [<http://www.troa.org/Magazine/March1999/veterans.htm>] on February 22, 2001.
- Declaratory Judgment Act. Pub. L. 104-208, div. A, title I, Sec. 101(b) (title VIII, Sec. 8069), (Sept. 30, 1996). Internet accessed [<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi->

bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=wais.access.gpo.gov&filename=publ208.104&directory=/diskc/wais/data/104_cong_public_laws] April 3, 2001.

Driscoll, John B. "Developing Joint Force Education for the Total Force." Joint Force Quarterly, no. 24 (2000): 87-91.

Gareev, Makhmut, General, ed. If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict. Edited by Jacob W. Kipp. London: Cass, 1998.

Gibbings, Thomas, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore. "Interagency Operations: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore." Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly. (Winter 1998): 99-112.

Hadley, Arkes. Bureaucracy, the Marshal Plan, and the National Interest. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1972.

Hahn II, Robert F. "Politics for Warriors: The Political Education of Professional Military Officers." Boston: Harvard University, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1997. Internet accessed [<http://data.fas.harvard>]

Hamblet, William P., and Jerry P. Kline. "Interagency Cooperation, PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations, Joint Forces Quarterly. (Spring 2000): 92-97.

Hays, Margaret Daly, DR., and Gary F. Weatley, RADM, USN (RET.). National Defense Universityinteragency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti - a Case Study on. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies, 1996. Internet accessed, [<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Haiti/haithome.html>] on January 19, 2001.

Hoff, Benjamin. The Tao of Pooh. New York; Penguin Books, 1982. In "Peace(keeping) in Our Time: The UN as a Professional Military Manager." Parameters. (Autumn 1996): 17-34. Internet accessed [<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96Autumn/hillen.htm>] on April 2, 2001.

Holbrook, Richard. To End a War. The Modern Library; New York, 1998.

Kaplan, Robert. The Coming Anarchy. Random House; New York, 2000.

Kuchevsheski, Robert. Director of Educational Programs, US Army Command and General Staff College. Personal interview, March 2 2001, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

Locher, James R. "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Force Quarterly (1996). Reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, Joint Force Command, Syllabus/Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, November 1999), p.M6-1-1.

- Lovelace, Douglas C. Jr. Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996. Internet accessed, [<http://Carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs96/dodact/dodact.htm>] on January 22, 2001.
- Marcella, Gabriel. "National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21st Century." In Organizing For National Security, ed. Douglas T. Stuart, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2000.
- Mendel, William W. and David G. Bradford. Interagency Cooperation, A Regional Model for Overseas Operations. McNair Paper no. 44. Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1995.
- Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC). Minutes from 16,17 October 1997 MECC Working Group. National Defense University. Provided by Dr. Kuschveski during personal interview, March 2, 2001.
- Moore, Scott W. "Today it's Gold, Not Purple," Joint Forces Quarterly. (Autumn/Winter 1998-99): 100-106.
- National Security Council. Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1998.
- National Security Council. Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 13, 1998. Internet accessed [http://www.pdd56.com/handbook_alt.htm], on April 2, 2001.
- Palmer, Bruce General. The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. Touchstone, New York, 1984.
- Skelton, Ike. "JPME: Are We There Yet?" Military Review, 77 (Jan/Feb 1997): 96-101. Internet accessed [<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/janfeb97/skelton.htm>] February 12, 2001.
- Stuart, Douglas T. Organizing for National Security. Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA. November 2000.
- _____. "Present at the Legislation: The 1947 National Security Act." In Organizing for National Security. Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA. November 2000.
- U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National

Security/21 st Century. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 15, 2001.

U.S. Department of Defense. "Central Command's Theater Strategy." Tampa: U.S. Central Command, 2001. Internet accessed
[http://www.centcom.mil/theater_strat/theater_strat.htm] on January 19, 2001.

_____. Department of Defense. Directive Number 1300.19, Department of Defense Joint Officer Management Program. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1997.

_____. "Program Overview." Defense Leadership and Management Program. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001. Internet accessed
[http://www.cpms.osd.mil/dlamp/about_overview.html] on April 5, 2001.

_____. "Strategy of Preparedness and Engagement in Africa." Germany: U.S. Europe Command, . Internet accessed
[<http://www.eucom.mil/africa/publications/strategy.htm>].

U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. "Federal Response Plan, Basic Brief." Updated March 1998. Brief provided by FEMA to US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, on March 17, 2001

U.S. Government Accounting Office. Combting Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program. Washington, D.C., February 2, 1998, T-Nsiad-99-16. Internet accessed,
[<http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/gaonunn.txt>] on February 13, 2001.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7. Vision for Professional Military Education. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999. Internet accessed
[<http://www.dtic.mil/mil-ed/index.html>] on February 6, 2001.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 23, 1994 amended January 10, 2000: 186-189.

_____. Joint Publication 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations, Final Coordination. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 5, 2001.

_____. Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 12, 1999.

_____. Joint Pub 3-08. Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. Vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 9, 1996.

_____. Officer Professional Military Education Policy. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01A. December 1, 2000.

_____. "Overview of National Security Structure." Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 2000. Internet accessed [<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/> - Joint Chiefs of Staff] February 25, 2001.

Anthony C. Zinni, General, U.S. Marine Corps. "A Commander Reflects." In the Defense Associations National Network National Network News, (Summer, 2000). Internet accessed [http://www.sfu.ca/~dann/nn7-2_4.htm] on February 14, 2001.